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373 
SUPREME COURT NORMS OF 
IMPERSONALITY 
SETTLED VERSUS RIGHT: A THEORY OF 
PRECEDENT. By Randy J. Kozel.1 Cambridge University 
Press. 2017. PP. x + 180. $99.99 (hardcover), $34.99 (paper). 
Allison Orr Larsen2 
INTRODUCTION 
In his new book, Settled Versus Right: A Theory of Precedent, 
Professor Randy Kozel assumes a rare role for law professors; he 
serves as a helpful collaborator rather than a snarky critic. 
Professor Kozel seeks a commitment to the impersonal features 
of Supreme Court decisions and a retreat from individual disputes 
over interpretive philosophy when it comes to discussion of 
precedent. His optimism is contagious, and Kozel has made bold 
strides towards a “second best stare decisis” that can be applied 
regardless of vast disagreement on the merits. Cynics may remain 
unpersuaded that nine individual Justices can transcend 
interpretive disagreements and commit to a communal 
understanding of a doctrine of precedent. But even for those 
cynics, Professor Kozel’s work provides a powerful lesson about 
norms. The Supreme Court is more than just a building across 
from the Capitol that houses nine individual lawmakers. As a two 
hundred and thirty-year-old institution with a rich tradition of its 
own, the Court has developed a set of distinct norms over time. 
From “the rule of four” (not needing a majority to grant cert) to 
the taboo of vote-trading, to the use of a plural noun when 
referring to past decisions, to the expectation that every word 
 
 1. Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. 
 2. Professor of Law, College of William & Mary. This Review was written for a 
conference in celebration of Randy Kozel’s book, Settled Versus Right: A New Theory of 
Precedent (Cambridge University Press 2017). I am very grateful to the organizers of the 
event, Kurt Lash & Jason Mazzone, for inviting me, and to my fellow participants for an 
engaging and inspiring discussion. 
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change in a draft opinion merits a re-circulation, the Court has 
developed its own norms of impersonality—norms that 
emphasize the “we” over the “I’s.” 
This Review will explore Supreme Court norms that both 
help and hinder Professor Kozel’s aspiration for impersonality at 
the Court. I will reiterate my old complaint about “self stare 
decisis”—the habit of reiterating a dissenting view each time an 
issue presents itself again; and I will offer a new norm when it 
comes to discussion of precedent. Even if the Justices can’t agree 
on whether a precedent is worthy of overruling, it seems a modest 
request to suggest such discussions happen at the outset, perhaps 
in their own initially circulated opinion or dedicated time at 
Conference. Bifurcating the discussion in this way (separating the 
discussion of precedent from the discussion of the merits) will 
help abate the temptation to gloss over the precedential 
discussion in order to get to the particulars of the case at hand. 
My hope is that norm changes such as these will further Professor 
Kozel’s laudable goal of changing “attitudes” and will capture 
many of the benefits he articulates that arise from demanding a 
common set of playing rules for nine individual decisionmakers. 
I. WHY IS IMPERSONALITY IMPORTANT? 
An important premise of Professor Kozel’s new book is that 
a collective doctrine of stare decisis is critical to demonstrating 
that the Constitution “truly is more than what five Justices say it 
is” (p. 5). His goal is to create a theory of stare decisis that is 
“designed to enhance the stability and impersonality of 
constitutional law” (p. 6). And he makes a powerful case for why 
this goal is an important one. 
Professor Kozel argues that precedent has value in 
conserving resources, acknowledging our limitations as individual 
decisionmakers, treating similar cases in a similar way, and 
furnishing common ground for justices who often disagree (pp. 
36-45). But, to me, the most compelling reason Professor Kozel 
offers for a communal understanding of precedent is its part in 
bolstering what Professor Kozel calls “impersonality” at the 
Supreme Court. By “impersonality,” Kozel means making “judge 
specific characteristics less salient in determining legal rights” (p. 
41). As he elegantly explains,  
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to follow the decisions of one’s predecessors is to embrace a 
conception of a court continuing over time. By deferring to 
precedent, a [J]ustice highlights her membership in a larger 
institution that predates her and will continue long after she is 
gone. . . . This is another way of saying the rule of law prevails 
over the rule of men and women (pp. 41-42). 
It is too easy to shorten this rationale (as we often do) to the 
simple—and all too loaded—word, “legitimacy.” The Court must 
keep more or less consistent over time, the common argument 
goes, in order to maintain its stature in the eyes of the public.3 But, 
as Professor Kozel helpfully reminds us, this argument undersells 
the value of impersonality quite a bit. What hangs in the balance 
of the precedent debate is more than just an approval rating for 
the Justices in a national opinion poll. The stakes are much higher 
than that. In Professor Kozel’s words, driving the commitment to 
impersonality at the Court is “the principle that all government 
officials, including judges, are bound by rules” (p. 42). Debates 
about precedent are so important, therefore, because the rule of 
law is so important. 
The rest of Professor Kozel’s book is devoted to developing 
a theory of what he calls “second best stare decisis”—a theory that 
operates independently of any interpretive methodology and 
seeks to unify judicial voices that find themselves so often in 
discord. Professor Kozel seeks to offer a set of rules about 
precedent that many can join as a second-best solution (second-
best to the result that would be reached under his or her preferred 
methodology). The goal of second-best stare decisis is to prevent 
discussions of precedent from getting bogged down into the 
merits and “becoming an echo chamber for controversial 
assertions about which theory of constitutional interpretation is 
best” (p. 139). 
There are likely some cynics who find this laudable goal a bit 
out of reach. The cynic’s concern is that no one Justice will check 
his interpretative baggage at the door in order to truly engage with 
the question of precedent in a way that is detached from his other 
commitments. The fear is that a communal doctrine of stare 
decisis will not constrain at all; a Justice will just manipulate the 
seemingly objective factors of second best stare decisis (reliance 
interests, factual change and the like) in order to reach the result 
 
 3. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 864–69 (1992) (plurality opinion). 
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that best aligns with his favored interpretive philosophy or 
normative priors or even the outcome that he wants to reach in 
the individual case. 
But even for those cynics, Professor Kozel’s work sheds light 
on an important problem and a potential solution. For hundreds 
of years, the Justices of the Supreme Court have created and 
maintained important norms of impersonality. They act and speak 
as a “we” over time. Even if those norms don’t constrain in any 
technical sense, they enact a powerful force of habit. 
To take an analogy that may speak to dog lovers, a dog on a 
leash will sometimes stay still in the park even when there is no 
one holding on to the leash’s handle. Because the dog is 
accustomed to the constraint, it toes the line even when it need 
not.4 So, too, can norms of impersonality act to constrain a Justice 
even when it does not formally bind her. The Court is an 
institution with a rich history and a prized internal reputation for 
objectivity and fairness. Perhaps it is time to leverage those norms 
of impersonality to change how the Justices discuss precedent. 
II. EXISTING NORMS OF IMPERSONALITY AT THE 
SUPREME COURT 
When a new member of the Court gets sworn in and walks 
up those stairs at number One First Street for the first time, he or 
she will quickly encounter some internal norms (and even more 
important norms than the weekly rotation of Wednesday mac and 
cheese in the cafeteria). These norms are the rules of the road—
common traditions passed down from one generation of Justices 
to the next. Of course Supreme Court norms are not formally 
binding, nor are they necessarily permanent, but they have proved 
to be sticky over time and (like for the dog in the park) they can 
do important constraining work. 
One norm at the Court that is firmly entrenched is the 
unwritten rule against vote trading. While some forms of strategic 
behavior at the Court are seen as permissible and perhaps 
inevitable (like, for example “insincere voting”—voting for one’s 
second choice—to form a majority coalition), the prevailing 
consensus is that explicit vote trading between cases is “roundly 
 
 4. As my co-panelists helpfully observed, this characteristic is not true of all dogs 
and likely has much to do with how an individual dog is trained—an aspect of the analogy 
that is still relevant to the present discussion. 
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condemned.”5 This norm means one Justice won’t say to another 
“I’ll vote with you in case X if you vote for me in case Y.”6 There 
are likely many reasons for this norm: when votes are traded 
across cases it decreases meaningful participation by the parties 
in any given case and cuts against the idea that deliberation 
between multiple minds within any one case improves 
decisionmaking. But another reason for this norm has to be 
related to fostering impersonality at the Court. As Evan 
Caminker explains in his article on the subject, there is a 
“commodification objection” to vote trading or a fear of a 
“market orientation towards judicial decisionmaking.”7 If votes 
can be traded across cases then that makes the judicial process 
look more like political wheeling and dealing by nine individuals 
and less like the work of a deliberative independent body that acts 
as one unit. Vote-trading cuts against, in other words, a sense of 
Supreme Court impersonality. 
A second Supreme Court norm is what has been called an 
“agenda-setting norm” colloquially known as “the Rule of Four.”8 
Under well-settled tradition (but not a written rule), when the 
Justices decide whether to hear a case it only take four votes to 
grant certiorari, not a majority of the Court.9 This non-majority 
rule is buttressed by another norm—“the Rule of Three”— 
meaning that it only takes three votes to hold a case while decision 
of a related issue is already pending at the Court.10 
Behind these agenda-setting norms is the sense that oral 
argument and briefing can change one’s mind about a case, and 
thus if enough members of the Court think a case is cert-worthy it 
makes sense to hear the case and see if a fifth member can be 
convinced. In the words of Justice Brennan: “in the context of a 
preliminary five to four vote to deny, five give four an opportunity 
 
 5. Evan Caminker, Sincere and Strategic Voting on Multi-Member Courts, 97 MICH. 
L. REV. 2297, 2300 (1999). 
 6. Id. at 2331. (“It is very difficult to identify clear examples of explicit vote trading. 
My own sense, in accord with that of other scholars, is that explicit vote trading rarely—
and perhaps never—takes place.”) 
 7. Id. at 2351–52. 
 8. LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 113 (1998). 
 9. The Rule of Four dates back at least until 1925 (or at least that is the year the 
norm became public). See Richard Revesz & Pam Karlan, Nonmajority Rules and the 
Supreme Court, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1067, 1069 (1988). 
 10. Id. at 1068. 
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to change at least one mind.”11 Indeed, this norm has led to a 
separate less well-known tradition—a “join three” custom.12 
Under this norm, if three Justices want to hear a case, and a fourth 
Justice is on the fence, the undecided member of the Court will 
cast her vote to “join three” and grant certiorari to hear the case. 
The idea behind this norm is a “team player” sensibility. For the 
Justice who supplies that fourth vote to grant cert she is sending a 
signal: we are more than just expressing individual preferences 
and there is value to deliberation and consideration as a collective 
unit. If three of her colleagues are sure a case is cert-worthy, then 
that is enough of a reason to at least flesh out the arguments and 
hear what the litigants have to say. There are institutional reasons, 
in other words, to vote to take a case even if as an individual one 
is unsure the case is cert-worthy. 
A third—more subtle—norm at the Court is the use of a 
plural pronoun when describing majority opinions (even old 
ones). When Justices refer to outcomes and rationales of past 
cases, they use the word “we,” even for cases that were decided 
long before the current Justices were born. And when an opinion 
is announced it is styled not as “the majority opinion,” but as “the 
opinion of the Court.”13 Relatedly, any time an author of an 
opinion changes a word of that opinion, the norm is that he will 
re-circulate the draft again to make sure that those Justices who 
have joined the initial draft opinion are comfortable with the 
change. Further, a majority will try “to accommodate a marginal 
Justice” by tweaking the opinion so the unsure Justice can join it, 
even when a five-vote coalition is already formed and that 
“marginal” vote is not strictly necessary.14 These norms of 
authorship play a role in enforcing impersonality at the Court. 
Every time a Justice writes the word “we” instead of “I” he is 
subtly enforcing—to himself as well as to others—that the 
enterprise of Supreme Court decisionmaking is a collective one. 
 
 11. Id. at 1100 (quoting Straight v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 2004, 2006 (1986) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting)). 
 12. S.M., How the Supreme Court Chooses Its Cases, THE ECONOMIST EXPLAINS 
(Feb. 24, 2015), https://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2015/02/economist-
explains-19 (“When Warren Burger was [C]hief [J]ustice in the 1970s and 1980s, a “join-
3” tradition meant that a [J]ustice might extend a courtesy fourth vote to supplement those 
of three of his colleagues who wanted to hear a case. This form of collegiality helped swell 
the [C]ourt’s docket to over 150 cases, but it is largely a thing of the past.”). 
 13. Lewis Kornhauser & Lawrence Sager, The One and the Many: Adjudication in 
Collegial Courts, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1, 7 (1993).  
 14. Caminker, supra note 5, at 2322. 
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This list of impersonality norms is only the beginning. There 
are plenty of other norms that have evolved around the Court’s 
work: no one but the nine Justices can enter the conference room 
to discuss the cases at the end of the argument week, the Justices 
offer their comments at conference in the order of their 
seniority,15 a brand new Justice is typically assigned an “easy” 
unanimous opinion to write first,16 and the Chief Justice attempts 
to assign opinions in a way that divides the workload evenly.17 
Moreover (in perhaps my favorite tradition) before proceeding to 
the bench or to conference the Justices all shake hands—a ritual 
that began in 1888 and requires 36 different handshakes.18 
Why do the Justices conform to these norms? To be sure, one 
reason is just to make life more pleasant for people who work 
together every day. As Chief Justice Warren explained after he 
retired, “[w]hen you are going to serve on a court . . . for the rest 
of your productive days, you accustom yourself to the institution 
like you do to the institution of marriage, and you realize that you 
can’t be in a brawl every day and still get satisfaction out of life.”19 
But there is more to it than that. As Justice O’Connor put it 
when explaining the handshake tradition: 
[It’s] a symbol of work we do as a collegial body. That is, you 
may be temporarily miffed because you received a spicy 
dissenting opinion from a colleague, but when we go to sit on 
the bench, we look at each other, shake hands, and it’s a way of 
saying, “We’re all in this together.” We care about this 
institution more than our individual egos, and we are all 
devoted to keeping the Supreme Court in the place that it is—
as a co-equal third branch of government and I think a model 
for the world in collegiality and independence of judges.20 
“We’re all in this together.” The sentence bears repeating. 
Justice O’Connor is echoing what Professor Kozel calls the need 
for “impersonality” at the Court; it is the desire to be a “we” 
rather than a set of “I’s.” And the reason for this impersonality is 
 
 15. CLARE CUSHMAN, COURTWATCHERS: EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS IN SUPREME 
COURT HISTORY 101 (2011). 
 16. Id. at 103. Justice Ginsburg has lamented that her first assignment was not in 
keeping with this tradition (or “legend”) that a “brand new Justice be slated for an 
uncontroversial unanimous opinion.” Id. 
 17. Id. at 154–55. 
 18. Id. at 146–47. 
 19. Id. at 143. 
 20. Id. at 147. 
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more than just for professional collegiality. The idea is that by 
building this sense of institutional duty—reflected in internal 
norms—the Court reinforces the notion that (in Professor Kozel’s 
words) “bedrock principles are founded in the law rather than the 
proclivities of individuals” (p. 41). 
These norms of impersonality are not inevitable and are not 
unbreakable. Indeed one can likely think of examples where the 
norms are violated—where the Justices do not comply with the 
rule of Four,21 or where the Court talks skeptically about an 
opinion as a “majority opinion” as opposed to a “majority of the 
Court.”22 But the fragility of the norms (and the fact that we notice 
and bristle when they are ignored) underscores the power and the 
importance of the norms to begin with. 
III. BUILDING NORMS OF IMPERSONALITY FOR 
PRECEDENT DISCUSSIONS 
The fact that so many norms bind the nine Justices to act like 
one institution makes me optimistic that a similar norm (or 
norms) could be built to surround precedent discussions. But for 
this to work there need to be at least two changes to existing 
norms: (1) a retreat against the current custom of pursuing a “self 
stare decisis”; and (2) an internal change to the timing of 
precedent discussions. 
A. THE UNHEALTHY NORM OF SELF STARE DECISIS 
Supreme Court Justices often repeat resistance to a decision 
even years after the ink on the decision dries in the U.S. Reports. 
I’ve called this practice a “perpetual dissent”23 and it should not 
take long for examples to come to mind: “I adhere to my belief 
that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual 
punishment”24; “I continue to believe that campaign finance laws 
are subject to strict scrutiny”25; “I am not yet ready to adhere to 
 
 21. See Revesz & Karlan, supra note 9.  
 22. Justice Scalia remarked on this phenomenon. See Martinez v. Ct. of Appeal of 
California, Fourth Appellate Dist., 528 U.S. 152, 165 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring)(“I do 
not share the apparent skepticism of today’s opinion concerning the judgment of the Court 
(often curiously described as merely the judgment of ‘the majority’) in Faretta v. 
California.”). 
 23. Allison Orr Larsen, Perpetual Dissents, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 447 (2008). 
 24. Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 324 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 25. FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 164 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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the proposition of law set forth in Seminole Tribe.”26 Perpetual 
dissents like these range widely over subject matter and are not 
confined to Justices of any particular ideology.27 The most well-
known use of the perpetual dissent was Justice Brennan and 
Justice Marshall repeating their view over 2,100 times that the 
death penalty was unconstitutional. But although this may be the 
most dramatic use of the perpetual dissent, Justices Brennan and 
Marshall are not alone: “[t]raditionally conservative justices are 
just as likely to dissent perpetually on issues such as abortion, 
sentencing reform, or punitive damages.”28 
Perpetual dissents are not brand new, but they do not have a 
long pedigree. It was not unusual as late as the 1930s for a Justice 
to engage in “silent acquiescence”—to decide not to register his 
disagreement with a decision in a dissent at all. Indeed separate 
opinions generally are relatively recent; political scientists mark 
the early 1940s as the moment in time where the Supreme Court 
saw “‘a radical and apparently permanent change’ from unanimity 
to ‘surging rates of concurring and dissenting opinions.’”29 
Importantly, these perpetual dissents are not generally 
accompanied by discussions of stare decisis (as in whether the 
Court should overrule the precedent due to changed 
circumstances or unworkability or the like). Instead, the Justice 
will repeat a dissent because of a continued distaste for the 
controlling precedent—because he dissented originally and still 
thinks the decision was wrong. The fact that a Justice dissented 
originally, in other words, is reason enough to dissent again when 
the rule from the first case is applied in a second case. A perpetual 
dissent leads to a custom of selective engagement with precedents. 
(“I’m not bound by case X because I didn’t join it originally.”) 
This norm can be seen as a form of “self stare decisis”—by 
which I mean the apparently important need the Justices feel to 
stay consistent over time as an individual jurist. Evidence for this 
norm goes beyond the perpetual dissent. It is common for the 
Justices to cite their own separate concurrences or dissents as 
 
 26. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 
666, 699 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 27. Larsen, supra note 23, at 450. 
 28. Id. at 451 (citations omitted). 
 29. Id. at 450 (quoting Thomas Walker, On the Mysterious Demise of Consensual 
Norms in the United States Supreme Court, 50 J. POL. 361, 361 (1988)). 
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authorities in a new case.30 The Justices will also cite separate 
opinions of their colleagues in an argumentative way as a means 
of pointing out inconsistencies. And they will even argue that 
because an individual Justice joined a prior dissent he or she 
should be embarrassed to join a majority in a new case touching 
on the same issue.31 Indeed, sometimes one can even find an 
explicit discussion by a Justice in one opinion explaining why it is 
consistent with his views in the past.32 These types of discussions 
reveal an anxiety—a need the Justices feel to appear intellectually 
consistent over time as an individual (hence, self stare decisis) 
separate and apart from the debate about the law’s need to be 
settled versus right. 
None of this is helpful for Professor Kozel’s goal of fostering 
impersonality at the Court. To be clear, I think it is perfectly 
legitimate for a Justice to vote to overrule a precedent—
sometimes it is more important for the law to be right rather than 
settled. My complaint instead is about venting individual disputes 
about Supreme Court precedents when overruling the precedent 
isn’t even on the table. Those norms—the norms that reinforce 
individual consistency over time as opposed to Court 
consistency—erode the goal of impersonality at the Supreme 
Court and detract from all of the rule-of-law reasons Professor 
Kozel persuasively offers for why impersonality is critical. 
There is an alternative. As Maurice Kelman suggested thirty 
years ago, a Justice can “table” her dissenting view until a 
majority of the Court agrees to revisit the question.33 This does 
 
 30. See, e.g., American Trucking Ass’n v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 545 U.S. 429, 
439 (2005) (Thomas J., dissenting) (“[T]he negative Commerce Clause has no basis in the 
text of the Constitution, makes little sense, and has proved virtually unworkable in 
application” (quoting Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 
564, 610 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting)). 
 31. See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 US 93, 326 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“I 
dissented in Austin, and continue to believe that the case represents an indefensible 
departure from our tradition of free and robust debate. Two of my colleagues joined the 
dissent including a Member of today’s majority.”). 
 32. See, e.g., United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 US 465, 479 (2003) 
(Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“I join the Court’s opinion, satisfied that it is not inconsistent 
with the opinion I wrote for the Court in United States v. Navajo Nation.”); James B. Beam 
Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 545 (1991) (White, J., concurring) (“Nothing in the 
above, however, is meant to suggest that I retreat from those opinions filed in this Court 
which I wrote or joined holding or recognizing that in proper cases a new rule announced 
by the Court will not be applied retroactively even to parties before the Court.”). 
 33. Maurice Kelman, The Forked Path of Dissent, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 227, 230–31 
(1985). 
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not have to be done silently. A Justice could even note in 
concurrence that he is “concurring under compulsion, abiding the 
time when he may win over the majority.”34 This was the path 
opted for by the second Justice Harlan. Although Justice Harlan 
was a known critic of Miranda and Mapp v. Ohio, he routinely 
joined subsequent opinions that applied these precedents.35 Far 
from sacrificing his own individual views on what was right, he was 
just following a Supreme Court norm of—in Kelman’s words—
“tabling” his dissenting view for the time being since revising the 
precedent as a Court was not in the cards. 
I suggest reviving the Justice Harlan norm of impersonality. 
This “concurring under duress”36 approach strikes a middle 
ground between allowing an individual Justice to stick to his guns 
while also conceding that there is a linear connection between 
individual Justices of the past and individual Justices of the 
present and recognizing the importance of reinforcing that line 
even at the expense of venting continued disagreement. 
B. A PROPOSAL FOR A NEW NORM OF TIMING FOR PRECEDENT 
DISCUSSIONS 
I have a second proposal for advancing the norms of 
impersonality with regard to Supreme Court precedent. Professor 
Kozel has entirely persuaded me that the question of stare decisis 
(the settled versus right debate) is too bogged down in principled 
disagreements among the Justices about constitutional 
methodology. Further he has convinced me that not only is the 
discussion of whether to overrule a precedent mired in 
disagreement on the merits, but so too is the discussion of when 
the precedent controls to begin with. Thus a champion for 
impersonality at the Court is facing a real uphill battle. The 
problem goes beyond knowing when the time is right to make a 
change in precedent (from, for example, Bowers to Lawrence or 
Plessy to Brown); the problem extends to even knowing when the 
time is right to have the discussion about whether the time is right. 
 
 34. Id. at 230–31. 
 35. See Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 327 (1969) (Harlan, J. concurring) (“The 
passage of time has not made the Miranda case any more palatable to me than it was when 
the case was decided . . . [but] purely out of respect for stare decisis, I reluctantly feel 
compelled to acquiesce[.]”). 
 36. See, e.g., Larsen, supra note 23, at 452. 
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Professor Kozel makes strong efforts to find a doctrinal 
solution to this problem. I wonder though if a separate route to 
the same destination lies in adjusting Supreme Court norms. The 
new norm would relate not to the content but to the timing of 
precedent discussions. I propose bifurcating the internal 
discussion at the Court about any particular case such that the 
Justices first debate whether a precedent applies or whether it is 
ripe for reversal before then turning to the merits of the case at 
hand. 
What I am suggesting is akin to an order of operations rule in 
math. The Justices should debate the scope of a precedent first: is 
there a prior decision on point? Or is the language in the prior 
case just dicta—a judicial “aside or hypothetical”—that does not 
earn binding effect? Second, assuming the prior case is on point, 
then the Justices can further debate whether the precedent 
deserves to be overruled. The second discussion can revolve 
around the issues Professor Kozel identifies as things the Justices 
should debate (the inquiry into workability, factual accuracy, and 
whether this is an exceptional case where undesirable 
consequences of a precedent should be given a shelf life) (pp. 99-
106). Only after those two discussions would the Justices then turn 
to the merits or the case (if necessary). This bifurcated discussion 
will, I think, significantly add to Professor Kozel’s goal for 
precedent generally—“that it allows some points to be taken as a 
given rather than perpetually debated” (p. 15). Perhaps the 
Justices need a chance to debate candidly with each other about 
“what is given.” 
This separate opinion circulation—the precedent discussion 
alone—could be done either orally (at Conference) or in written 
form, but I think it is likely to be most valuable if it is kept private. 
While I am in favor of transparency generally, norm generation 
may take some internal politicking that should be shielded from 
external scrutiny. The need that the Justices feel to stay internally 
consistent as individuals might at least partially exist from 
criticism originating from Court-watchers and academics. It might 
foster more candid conversations for the nine to debate the scope 
and applicability of precedent internally—free from eyes of 
outsiders. 
In this vein, consider how Justice Thomas describes the 
Conference discussions (discussions kept secret from all but the 
nine): “people are engaged; they actually talk about the case. 
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They actually tell you what they think and why. . . [a]nd there’s 
some back and forth . . . [even] discussions off to the sides.”37 The 
internal deliberation—the back and forth—is part of what justifies 
a counter-majoritarian judiciary in the first place. Why not 
leverage this candor to discuss one of the hardest things the Court 
has on its plate—the settled versus right question. The ultimate 
opinion disposing of the case would be published and would likely 
include elements of the initial conversation. But by giving the 
Justices space to debate precedent privately first, we encourage 
the difficult cognitive task of separating “is this the outcome I 
want?” from “is there a reason to overrule the past decision?” 
Another benefit to a separate internal discussion on 
precedent is to stem the temptation to distinguish precedents 
artificially in order to avoid them. To be sure, there is nothing to 
stop a determined Justice from disingenuously distinguishing a 
precedent she does not want to deal with—either in a publicly 
accessible opinion or an internally debated one. But one should 
not overlook the power of internal dynamics, particularly from 
repeat players who work closely together for decades and are 
committed to being a “we.” 
Why would the Justices adopt this new procedural custom, 
particularly if they have the votes to do what they want to do 
without it? For one thing, the Justices might be more likely to 
reach agreement in the abstract rather than when a concrete 
outcome is on the table. There are reasons we have a preliminary 
discussion on the rules of a poker game, for example, at a moment 
before the cards are dealt. Assuming everyone at the table thinks 
agreement is a good thing, it is easier to get there before we know 
what cards we have and are differently invested in the results. 
Certainly some of the “cards” are already dealt at the Court—the 
Justices hold various commitments to stare decisis that reflect 
their interpretive methodology. But even so, the conversation 
dynamics change when the issue is front and center and the battle 
lines are drawn. Thus, perhaps a new norm about the timing of 
precedent discussion could be instituted at an annual retreat, or a 
discussion among the Justices that is otherwise independent from 
the merits of any particular issue. 
Still, why would the Justices have the motivation to bind 
themselves in this way? It is important to remember that of all the 
 
 37. CUSHMAN, supra note 15, at 152. 
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firm advocates for impersonality at the Supreme Court (including 
Professor Kozel and myself), the Justices themselves are the true 
believers. The Justices don’t want to believe that “power not 
reason is the currency of the Court’s decision-making” (p. 35). It 
is the Justices themselves who promote the view that the 
Constitution “truly is more than what five Justices say it is” (p. 5). 
The “we’re all in this together” sentiment voiced by Justice 
O’Connor is very much a real sentiment at the Court, buttressed 
by years of norms that reinforce it. 
What is often overlooked—but is important to recognize—is 
that this norm of impersonality is not just crucial for the 
appearance of legitimacy to the outside world, but it is also central 
to the way the Justices view each other. When describing what 
Conference looks like from the inside, Justice Kennedy explained: 
It’s like being an attorney once again. . . . We sometimes have 
as many as six cases and I have to present the argument . . . and 
I have to be professional and accurate and fair. And each of my 
colleagues feels the same way so there is a little tension and 
excitement in the room, but we love it. We’re lawyers, we’re 
designed to do that.38 
It is that internal commitment to being “professional and 
accurate and fair” (in Justice Kennedy’s words) that I think can 
be used to improve the Court’s approach to precedent. The 
Justices can be trusted to call each other out for shenanigans 
(disingenuous distinctions, for example) when they are given the 
space to do so. 
At bottom, my suggestion is to take what the Supreme Court 
already seems to have—an internal commitment to impersonality 
and (relatedly) an ambition to strive to protect the rule of law—
and leverage that institutional desire to improve discussion of 
precedent. By separating the discussion of precedent from the 
discussion on the merits and cementing that bifurcation as a 
Supreme Court norm, we may be able to achieve Professor 
Kozel’s goal of “using precedent to bridge judicial 
disagreements.” We are using Supreme Court custom and 
commitment to legal reasoning to achieve a more objective 
conversation about the hardest choices they must make. Along 
the way we remind each other of the important last lines of 
 
 38. CUSHMAN, supra note 15, at 147. 
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Professor Kozel’s book: “Judges come and go but the law remains 
the law. That is the promise of precedent” (p. 176). 
